IF race-thinking were a German invention, as it is now sometimes asserted, then "German thinking" (whatever that may be) was victorious in many parts of the spiritual world long before the Nazis started their illfated attempt at world conquest. Hitlerism exercised its strong international and inter-European appeal during the 'thirties because racism, although a state doctrine only in Germany, had been everywhere a powerful trend in public opinion. The Nazi political warmachine had long been in motion when in 1939 German tanks began their march of destruction, since-in political warfare-racism was calculated to be a more powerful ally than any paid agent or any secret organization of fifth columnists. Strengthened by the experiences of almost two decades in the various capitals, the Nazis were confident that their best "propaganda" would be their racial policy itself, from which, despite many other compromises and broken promises, they had never drifted away for expediency's sake.1 Racism was neither a new nor a secret weapon, though never before had it been used with this thorough-going consistency.
The historical truth of the matter is that race-thinking, with its roots deep in the 18th century, emerged during the 19th century simultaneously in all Western countries. Racism has been the powerful ideology of imperialistic policies since the turn of our century. It certainly has absorbed and revived all the old patterns of race opinions which, however, by themselves hardly would have been able to create or, for that matter, to degenerate into racism as a "Weltanschauung" or an ideology. For the "'idea" of race does not belong in the history of ideas, and not until the end of the last century were dignity and impor-inence to survive the hard competitive struggle of persuasion, and only two have come out on top and essentially defeated all others: the ideology which interprets history as an economic struggle of classes, and the other that interprets history as a natural fight of races. The appeal of both to large masses was so strong that they were able to obtain state support and establish themselves as official national doctrines. But far beyond the boundaries in which race-thinking and classthinking have developed into obligatory patterns of thought, free public opinion has adopted them to such an extent that not only intellectuals but great masses of people will no longer accept any presentation of past or present facts that is not in agreement with these views.
The tremendous power of persuasion inherent in the main ideologies of our times is not accidental. Persuasion is not possible without appeal to either experiences or desires, in other words to immediate political needs. Though it is futile to argue with ideologies -racism has survived libraries of refutations -an explanation may be extremely fruitful which meets the ideologies on their own ground, on the basis from which they have grown. And this basis is formed neither by scientific facts, as the various brands of Darwinists would like to have us believe, nor by historical laws, as the historians pretend, in their efforts to discover the law according to which civilizations rise and fall. Every full-fledged ideology has been created, continued and improved as a political weapon and not as a theoretical doctrine. It is true that sometimes -and such is the case with racism -an ideology has changed its original political sense; but without immediate contact with political life none of them could be imagined. Their scientific aspect is secondary and arises first, from the desire to provide for watertight arguments, and secondly, because their persuasive power got hold also of scientists, who no longer were interested in their research-results but left their laboratories and hurried off to preach to the multitude their new interpretations of life and world.8 We owe it to these "scientific" preachers 8 "Huxley neglected scientific research of his own from the '70's onward, so busy was he in the role of 'Darwin's bulldog' barking and biting at theologians." Hayes, op. cit., p. 126. Ernst Haeckel's passion for popularizing scientific results which was at least as strong as his passion for science itself, has been stressed recently by an applauding Nazi writer, H. Bruecher, Ernst Haeckel. Ein Wegbereiter biologischen Staatsdenklens. In: Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte, (1935), Heft 69.
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THE REVIEW OF POLITICS rather than to any scientific results that to-day no single science is left into whose categorical system race-thinking has not deeply penetrated. This again has stimulated historians, some of whom have been tempted to make science responsible for race-thinking, to mistake certain either philological or biological research results for causes instead of consequences of race-thinking. 9 If it is unjust to make any particular science responsible for pseudoscientific superstition, it is directly harmful to reconstruct the history of Nazism in such a way as to provide it with an excellent genealogy. From Plato to Nietzsche there is hardly a philosopher left who has not been either praised by Nazi intellectuals -or accused by their foesof having been a forerunner of their monstrosities. Recently Machiavelli was freed from the dubious honor in one of the very beautiful articles of Jacques Maritain;10 and some years ago, even Nietzsche was rightly 9 This quid pro quo partly was the result of the zeal of students who wanted to put down every single instance in which race has been mentioned. Thereby they mistook relatively harmless authors for whom explanation by race was a possible and sometimes fascinating opinion for full-fledged racists. Such opinions, in themselves harmless, were advanced by the early anthropologists as starting-points of their investigations. A typical instance is the naive hypothesis of Paul Broca, noted French anthropologist of the middle of the last century, who assumed that "the brain has something to do with race and the measured shape of the skull is the best way to get at the contents of the brain" (quoted after Jacques Barzun, op. cit., p. 162). It is obvious that this assertion without the support of a conception of the nature of man, is simply ridiculous.
As for the philologists of the early 19th century, whose concept of "Aryanism" has seduced almost every student of racism to count them under the propagandists or even invento's of race-thinking, they are as innocent as innocent can be. When they overstepped the limits of pure research it was because they wanted to include in the same cultural brotherhood as many nations as possible. In the words of Ernest Seilliere, La Philosophie de l'lmp&rialisme (4 vols. 1903-1906) "Ce fut alors une sorte d'enivrement: la civilisation moderne crut avoir retrouve ses titres de famille.... et l'organisme naquit, unissant dans une meme fraternite toutes les nations dont langue presentait quelques affinites sanscrites." (Preface, Tome I, p. xxxv.) In other words, these men still belonged to the humanistic traditicn of the 18th century and shared its enthusiasm about strange people and exotic cultures.
On the other side, it has been a rather common error of the few scholars who were immune to racism because of their true humanism, to place a great deal of responsibility for modern bestiality on the naturalistic or biological outlook on life. But the opposite would have come closer to the truth. As a matter of fact, the doctrine that Might is Right needed several centuries (from the 17th to the 19th) until it had conquered natural science and produced the "law" of the survival of the fittest. And if, to take another instance, the theory of De Maistre and Schelling about savage tribes as the decaying residues of former peoples had suited the 19th century political devices as well as the theory of progress, we would probably have never heard much of "primitives" and no scientist would have wasted his time looking for the "missing link" between ape and man. The blame is not to be laid on any science as such, but rather on certain scientists who in no lesser degree than their fellow-citizens became hypnotized by ideologies. 10 See, Review of Politics, January, 1942.
shown not to have been the spiritual father of this "master-race" in a very courageous book of the German philosopher Karl Jaspers.11 But in the meanwhile, the number of victims among spiritual mankind has become legion. Thomas Aquinas is among them because he was a Catholic and authoritarian, Luther because he was a Protestant and a Jewhater, Kant because he was a Prussian, and Hegel because he idolized the State. To be sure, there are still a few left who have not yet been slandered by either side; they still await their "interpreter."
The fact that racism is the main ideological weapon of imperialistic politics is so obvious that it seems as though many students prefer to avoid the beaten track of a truism. Instead, an old misconception about racism being a kind of exaggerated nationalism is still given currency. Valuable works of students, especially in France, who have proved that racism is not only a quite different phenomenon but tends to destroy the body politic of the nation are generally overlooked. Witnessing the gigantic competition between race-thinking and class-thinking for dominion over the minds of modern man, some have been inclined to see in the former the expression of national and in the latter the expression of international trends, to believe the former to be the mental preparation for national wars and the latter to be the ideology for civil wars. This has been possible because of the last war's curious mixture of old national and new imperialistic conflicts, a mixture in which old national slogans proved still to possess a far greater appeal to the masses of all countries involved than any imperialistic aims. In this war, however, with its Quislings and collaborationists everywhere, it should be clear that racism has stirred up civil conflicts in every country, and that racism has proved to be the most ingenious device for preparing civil war that has ever been invented.
For the truth is that race-thinking entered the scene of active politics at the very moment when the European peoples had prepared, and to a certain extent had realized, the new body politic of the nation. From the very beginning, racism deliberately cut across all national boundaries, whether these were defined by geographical or linguistic or traditional or any other standards, and denied national-political existence as such. Race-thinking, rather than class-thinking, has been the ever-present shadow which accompanied the development of the comity of European nations, until it finally grew to be the powerful weapon for the destruction of those nations. Historically speaking, racists have a worse record of patriotism than all representatives of other international ideologies together, and they were the only ones who consistently denied the great principle upon which national organizations of peoples are built, the principle of equality and solidarity of all peoples guaranteed by the idea of mankind.
II
A "race" of aristocrats against a "nation" of citizens.
The birth of the nation and a steadily rising enthusiasm for the most different, strange and even savage peoples had been the characteristics of France during the 18th century. It was the time when Chinese paintings were admired and imitated, when one of the most famous works of the century was named Lettres Persanes and when travellers' reports made the favorite reading of society. The honesty and simplicity of the savage and uncivilized peoples were opposed to the sophistication and frivolity of culture. Long before the 19th century with its tremendously enlarged travelling possibilities brought the non-European world into the home of every average citizen, French society of the 18th century had tried to grasp spiritually the content of cultures and countries that lay far beyond European boundaries. A great enthusiasm for "new specimens of mankind" (Herder) filled the hearts of the heroes of the French Revolution who together with the French nation liberated every people of every color wherever the French flag flew. This enthusiasm for strange and foreign countries culminated in the message of fraternity, because it had been inspired by the desire to prove in every new and surprising "specimen of mankind" the old saying of La Bruyere: "La raison est de tous les climats."
It still is the same nation-creating century and the same humanityloving country to which we have to trace back the first germs of what later proved to become the nation-destroying and humanity-annihilating power of racism.12 It is a remarkable fact that the first author who assumed the coexistence of different peoples with different origins in France, was at the same time the first to elaborate definite class-thinking. The Comte de Boulainvilliers, a French nobleman who wrote at the beginning of the 18th century and whose works were published after his death, interpreted the history of France as the history of two different nations of which the one, of Germanic origin, had conquered the older inhabitants, the "Gaules," had imposed upon them its law, had taken their lands, and had settled down as the ruling class, the "peerage" whose supreme rights rested upon the "right of conquest" and the "necessity of obedience always due to the strongest." 3 Engaged in his arguments against the rising political power of the Tiers Etat and their spokesmen, the "nouveau corps" formed by "gens de lettres et de lois," Boulainvilliers had to wage war against the monarchy too because the French king no longer wanted to represent the peerage as primus inter pares but the nation as a whole; in him, for a while, the new rising class had found its most powerful protector. In order to regain the uncontested primacy of the nobility, Boulainvilliers proposed to his fellow noblemen to deny that they shared a common origin with the French people, to break up the unity of the nation and to claim an original and therefore eternal distinction.14 Being much bolder than most of the later defenders of nobility, Boulainvilliers denied any predestined connection with the soil; he conceded that the Gaules have been longer in France, that the "Francs" were strangers and barbarians. It is a rather curious fact that from these early times when French noblemen in their class struggle against the bourgeoisie discovered that they belonged to another nation, had another genealogical origin, and were more closely tied up with an international caste than with the soil of France, all French racial theories have supported the Germanism or at least the superiority of the Nordic peoples as against their own countrymen. For if the men of the French Revolution identified themselves mentally with Rome, it was not because they were opposing to the "Germanism" of their nobility a "Latinism" of the bourgeoisie, but because they felt themselves the spiritual heirs of Roman Republicans. This historical claim as contrasted to the tribal identification of the nobility, might have been among the causes which prevented "Latinism" from emerging as a racial doctrine of its own. At any event, paradoxical as it sounds, the fact is that Frenchmen earlier than Germans or Englishmen were to insist on this idee fxe of Germanic superiority. only when, after 1870, the unification of the nation actually had taken place and German racism, together with German imperialism, fully developed. From these early times, however, there survived not a few characteristics which have remained significant for the specifically German brand. of race-thinking.
In contrast to France, Prussian noblemen felt their interests to be closely connected with the position of the absolute monarchy and, at least since the time of Frederick II, they sought recognition as the legitimate representatives of the nation as a whole. With the exception of the few years of Prussian reforms (from 1808-1812), the Prussian nobility was not frightened by the rise of a bourgeois class that might have wanted to take over the government, nor did they have to fear an immoral coalition between the middle-classes and the ruling house. The Prussian King, up to 1809 the greatest landlord of the country, remained primus inter pares despite all efforts of the reformers. Racethinking, therefore, developed outside the nobility, as a weapon of certain nationalists who wanted the union of all German-speaking peoples and therefore insisted on a common origin. They were liberals in the sense that they were rather opposed to the exclusive rule of the Prussian Junkers. As long as this common origin was defined by common language, one can hardly speak of race-thinking.?4 It is characteristic that only after 1814 is this common origin described frequently in terms of "blood relationship," of family ties, of tribal unity, of unmixed origin. These definitions, which almost simultaneously appear in the writings of the Catholic Josef Goerres and of the nationalistic liberals such as Ernest Moritz Amdt or F. L. Jahn, bear witness to the utter failure of the hopes of rousing true national sentiments in the German people. Out of the failure to raise the people to nationhood, out of the lack of common historical memories and the apparent popular apathy to common future destinies, a naturalistic appeal was born which addressed itself to tribal instincts If in the early form of French aristocracy, race-thinking had been invented as an instrument of internal division, and had turned out to be a weapon for civil war, this early form of German race-doctrine had been invented as a weapon of internal national unity and turned out to be a weapon for national wars. As the decline of the French nobility as an important class within the French nation would have made this weapon useless if the foes of the Third Republic had not revived it, so upon the accomplishment of German national unity the organic doctrine of history would have lost its meaning had not modern imperialistic schemes wanted to revive it, in order to appeal to the people and to hide their hideous faces under the respectable cover of nationalism. The same does not hold true for another source of German racism which, though seemingly more remote from the scene of politics, had a far stronger genuine bearing upon present political ideologies.
Political romanticism has been accused of having invented racethinking, as it has been and could be accused of having invented every other possible irresponsible opinion. Adam Mueller and Friedrich Schlegel are symptomatic in the highest degree of a general confusion of modern thought in which almost any opinion can gain ground temporarily. No real thing, no historical event, no political idea was safe from the all-embracing and all-destroying mania of these first literati to find new and original opportunities for new and fascinating opinions. "The world must be romanticized," as Novalis puts it, who wanted "to bestow a high sense upon the common, a mysterious appearance upon the ordinary, the dignity of the unknown upon the wellknown."30 One of these romanticized objects was the people, an object that could be changed on a moment's notice into the state, or the family, or nobility, or anything else that either -in the earlier days happened to cross the minds of one of these intellectuals or -later when growing older they had learned the reality of daily bread --happened to be asked for by some paying patron.31 Therefore it is almost impossible to study the development of any of the free competing opinions of which the 19th century is so amazingly full, without coming across Romanticism in its German form.
What these first modern intellectuals actually prepared was not so much the development of any single opinion but the general mentality of modem German scholars; these latter have proved more than once that there can be found hardly any ideology to which they would not willingly submit if the only reality -which even a romantical person can hardly afford to overlook -is at stake, the reality of their position. For this peculiar behavior, Romanticism provided the most excellent pretext in its unlimited idolization of the "personality" of the individual, whose very arbitrariness became the very proof of genius. Whatever served the so-called productivity of the individual, namely, the entirely arbitrary game of his "ideas," could be made the center of a whole outlook of life and world.
This inherent cynicism of Romantic personality-worship has made possible certain modern attitudes of intellectuals who are fairly well represented by Mussolini, one of the last heirs of this movement, when he described himself as at the same time "aristocrat and democrat, revolutionary and reactionary, proletarian and anti-proletarian, pacifist and anti-pacifist." The ruthless individualism of romanticism,never meant anything more serious than that "everybody is free to create for himself his own ideology." What was new in Mussolini's bloody experiment was the "attempt to carry it out with all possible energy."32 Because of this inherent "relativism" the direct contribution of romanticism to the development of race-thinking can almost be neglected. In the anarchic game whose rules entitle everybody at any given time to at least one personal and arbitrary opinion, it is almost a matter of course that every conceivable opinion would be formulated and duly printed. Much more characteristic than this chaos was the fundamental belief in personality as an ultimate aim in itself. In Germany, where the conflict between the nobility and the rising middle-class was never fought out on the political scene, personality-worship developed as the only means of gaining at least some kind of social emancipation. The governing class of the country frankly showed its traditional contempt for business and its dislike for association with merchants in spite of the latter's growing wealth and importance, so that it was not easy to find the means of winning some kind of self-respect. The classic German Bildungsroman, Wilhem Meister, in which the middle-class hero is educated by noblemen and actors because the bourgeois in his own social sphere is without "personality," is evidence enough of the hopelessness of the situation.33
German intellectuals, though they hardly promoted any political fight of the middle-classes to which they belonged, fought an embittered and, unfortunately, highly successful battle for social equality. Even those who had offered their pen for the defence of nobility still felt their very interests at stake when it came to social ranks. In order to enter competition with rights and qualities of birth, they formulated the new concept of the "innate personality" which was to win general approval within bourgeois society. Like the title of the heir of an old family, the "innate personality" was given by birth and not acquired by merit. Just as the lack of common history for the formation of the nation had been artificially overcome by the naturalistic concept of organic deevlopment, so, in the social sphere, nature itself was supposed to supply a title when political reality had refused it. Liberal writers soon boasted of "true nobility" as opposed to the shabby titles of a Baron or others which could be given and taken away, and asserted, by implication, that their natural privileges, like "force or genius," could not be retraced to any human deed.34
The discriminatory point of this new social concept was immediately affirmed. During the long period of mere social anti-Semitism which introduced and prepared the discovery of Jew-hating as a political weapon, it was the lack of "innate personality," the innate lack of tact, the innate lack of productivity, the innate disposition for trading, etc., which separated the attitude of the average businessman from the behavior of his Jewish colleague. In its feverish search to summon up some pride of its own against the caste arrogance of the Junkers, without, however, daring to fight for political leadership, the bourgeoisie from the very beginning wanted to look down not so much on other lower classes of their own, but on other peoples. Most significant for these attempts is the small literary work of Clemens Brentano35 which was written for and read in the ultra-nationalistic club of Napoleonhaters that gathered together in 1808 under the name of "Die Christlich-Deutsche Tischgesellschaft." In his highly sophisticated and witty manner, Brentano points out the contrast between the "innate personality," the genial individual, and the "philistine" whom he immediately identifies with Frenchmen and Jews. Thereafter, the German bourgeois would at least try to attribute to other peoples all the qualities which the nobility despised as typically bourgeois -at first to the French, later to the English, and always to the Jews. As to the mysterious qualities which an "innate personality" received at birth, they were exactly the same as those the real Junkers claimed for themselves.
Although in this way standards of nobility contributed to the rise of race-thinking, the Junkers themselves did hardly anything for the shaping of this mentality. It was Adam Mueller who insisted on purity of descent as a test of nobility, and it was Haller who went beyond the obvious fact that the powerful ones rule those deprived of power by stating it as a natural law that the weak should be dominated by the strong. Noblemen, of course, applauded enthusiastically when they learned that their usurpation of power was not only legal but in accordance with natural laws, and it was rather a consequence of bourgeois definitions that during the course of the 19th century they In this respect it is interesting to note that the only Junker of this period to develop a political theory of his own, Ludwig von der Marwitz, never indulged in racial terms. According to him, nations are separated by language-a spiritual and not a physical difference-and although he is violently opposed to the French Revolution, he actually speaks like Robespierre when it comes to the possible aggression of one This insistence on common tribal origin as an essential of nationhood formulated by German nationalists during and after the war of 1814 and the emphasis laid by the Romantics on the innate personality and natural nobility prepared the way intellectually for racethinking in Germany. From the former sprang the organic doctrine of history with its natural laws; from the latter arose at the end of the century the grotesque homunculus of the superman whose natural destiny it is to rule the world. As long as these trends ran side by side, they were but temporary means of escape from political realities. Once welded together, they formed the very basis for racism, as a full-fledged ideology. This, however, did not happen first in Germany, but in France, and was not accomplished by middle-class intellectuals but by a highly gifted and frustrated nobleman, the Comte de Gobineau.
IV
The new key to history. Nor can it be doubted that this anticipation of death had something to do with the sudden outburst of brutality at the end of the century, when poets were among the first to yearn for a machinery of death, be it in France, again under the sign of civil war, or in England under the cover of imperialistic glory, or in Germany behind the clouds of confused mythicism which preached "der Gernnanen Untergang." It is to this peculiar pessimistic mood, to the active despair of the last decades of the century that Gobineau owed his belated fame. This, however, does not necessarily mean that he himself belonged to the generation of "the merry dance of death and trade" (Joseph Conrad). He was neither a statesman who believed in business nor a poet who praised death. He was only a curious mixture of frustrated nobleman and modern intellectual who almost by accident invented racism. This happened when he saw that he could not simply accept the old doctrines of the two peoples within France and that, in view of changed circumstances, he had to change the old line of defence that the best men necessarily are on top of society. In sad contrast to his teachers, he had to explain why the best men, noblemen, could not even hope to regain their former position.
Step by step, he identified the fall of his caste with the fall of France, then of Western civilization, and then of the whole of mankind. Thereby he made that discovery for which he was so much admired by later writers and biographers, the discovery that the fall of civilizations is due to a degeneration of race and that the decay of race is due to the mixture of blood. This implies that every mixture produces bad races and that the lower race always is victorious. This kind of argumentation, almost commonplace after the turn of the century, did not fit in with all the progress doctrines of Gobineau's contemporaries, who soon became obsessed with another idee fixe, the "survival of the fittest." The liberal optimism of the victorious bourgeoisie wanted a new edition of the old might-right theory, and not the key to history or the proof of inevitable decay. In vain Gobineau tried to get a wider audience by taking sides in the American slave dispute and by conveniently building his whole system on the basic conflict between white and black. He had to wait almost 50 years to become a success among the elite, and not until the first world war with its wave of death-philosophies could his works claim wide popu- While the seeds of German race-thinking were planted during the Napoleonic wars, the first indications of the later English development appeared during the French Revolution and may be traced back to the man who violently denounced it as the "most astonishing (crisis) that has hitherto happened in the world," -to Edmund Burke.50 The tremendous influence his work has exercised not only on England but on the whole Continent, and above all on German political thought, is well-known. The fact, however, must be stressed because of resemblances between German and English race-thinking as contrasted with the French brand. These resemblances stem from the fact that both countries having defeated the Tricolor showed a certain tendency to discriminate against the ideas of Liberte-Egalite-Fraternite as foreign inventions. Social inequality being the basis of English society, British Conservatives felt not a little uncomfortable when it came to the matter of the "rights of men." According to opinions widely held by 19th century Tories, inequality belonged to the national English character. Beaconsfield found "somnthina better than the Rights of Men in the rights of Englishmen" and to Sir James Stephen "few things in history (seemed) so beggarly as the degree to which the French allowed themselves to be excited about such things."51 This is one of the reasons why they could afford to develop race-thinking along national lines until the end of the 19th century, whereas the same opinions in France, from the very beginning showed their true anti-national face.
The main argument of Burke against the "abstract principles" of the French Revolution is contained in the following sentence: "It has been the uniform policy of our constitution to claim and assert our liberties, as an entailed inheritance derived to us from our forefathers, and to be transmitted to our posterity; as an estate specially belonging to the people of this kingdom, without any reference whatever to any other more general or prior right."52 This principle of inheritance applied to the very nature of liberty has been the ideological basis from which English nationalism received its curious touch of race-feeling ever since the time of the French Revolution. Formulated by a middleclass writer, it signified the direct acceptance of the feudal concept of liberty as the sum total of privileges inherited together with title and land. Without encroaching upon the rights of the privileged class within the English nation, Burke enlarged the very principle of these privileges to include the whole English people, constituting them as a kind of nobility among nations. Hence he drew his contempt for those who claimed their franchise as the rights of men, rights which he saw fit to claim only as "the rights of Englishmen." (p. 30.) In England nationalism has developed without serious attacks on the old feudal classes. This has been possible because the English gentry, from the 17th century on and in ever increasing numbers, had assimilated the higher ranks of the bourgeoisie so that sometimes actually the common man could attain the position of a lord. By this process much of the ordinary caste arrogance of nobility was taken away and a considerable sense of general responsibility for the nation as a whole was created; but by the same token, feudal concepts and mentality could influence the political ideas of the lower classes easier than it was possible elsewhere. Thus, the concept of inheritance was accepted almost unchanged and applied to the entire British "stock." The consequence of this assimilation of noble standards was that the specific English brand of race-thinking became almost obsessed with inheritance theories and their modern equivalent, eugenics.
Ever since the European peoples had made practical attempts to include in their conception of humanity all the peoples of the earth, they have been irritated by the fact of great bodily differences between themselves and the peoples they found on other continents.53 The 18th century enthusiasm for the diversity in which the all-present identical nature of man and reason could find expression had given a rather thin cover of arguments to the all-important question, whether the Christian teaching of the unity and equality of all men, based upon common descent from a single original couple of parents, would be kept in the hearts of men who were faced with tribes which, as far as we know, never had found by themselves any adequate expression of human reason or human passion in either cultural deeds or popular customs, and the rather bitter language of people who had known the hard struggle for daily bread, and had fought their way to the relative security of upstarts.
Darwinism met with such overwhelming success because it provided, on the basis of inheritance, the ideological weapons for race as well as class rule and could be used for as well as against race-discrimination. Politically speaking, Darwinism, as such, was neutral and has led, indeed, to all kinds of pacifism and cosmopolitanism as well as to the sharpest forms of imperialistic ideologies.59 For political discussion, Darwinism offered two important concepts: the struggle for existence with optimistic assertion of the necessary and automatic "survival of the fittest" and the indefinite possibilities, which seemed to lie in the evolution of man out of animal life and which started the new "science" of eugenics.
The doctrine of the necessary survival of the fittest with its implication that those on top of society eventually are the "fittest" died as the old conquest doctrine had died, namely, at the very moment when, either in England herself, the ruling classes or, abroad, the English domination in colonial possessions were no longer absolutely secure, and when it became highly doubtful whether those who are "fittest" today would still be the fittest tomorrow. The other part of Darwinism, the genealogy of man from animal life unfortunately survived. Eugenics pretended to be able to overcome the arbitrariness of the survivaldoctrine with which nobody could foretell who would come out as the fittest and to be able to provide for means of development which, when adopted as a nation, would lead it to the immortal fields of everlasting fitness.6) The process of selection had only to be changed from a natural necessity which worked behind the backs of men into an "arti- The most dangerous aspect of these evolutionist doctrines is that they combined the inheritance concept with the insistence on personal achievements and individual character which had been so important for the self-respect of the 19th century middle-class. This middle-class called for scientists who could prove that not the aristocrats but the great men were the true representatives of the nation, in whom the "genius of the race" was personified. These scientists provided an ideal escape from political responsibility when they "proved" the early statement of Benjamin Disraeli that the great man is "the personification of race, its choice exemplar." The development of this "genius" found its logical end when another disciple of evolutionism simply declared: "The Englishman is the Overman and the history of England is the history of his evolution."67 It is significant for English as it was for German race-thinking that it came from middle-class writers and not from the nobility, that it was born of the desire to extend the benefits of noble standards to all classes and that it was nourished by trends of true national feelings. In this respect, Carlyle's concepts of geniuses and heroes were much more fact nor the key to history but a much needed guide in the present world, the only reliable link within a boundless space.
Because English colonists had spread all over the earth, it so happened that the most dangerous concept of nationalism, the idea of "national mission," received in England an especially strong stimulant.75 Although national mission as such developed for a long while untinged by racial influences and in all countries where peoples aspired to nationhood, it proved finally to have a peculiarly close affinity to race-thinking. The above-quoted English nationalists may all be considered as cases on the borderline.76 For all of them though not giving up the idea of mankind consider England as the supreme guarantee for humanity. They could not but be inclined to overstress this nationalistic concept because of its inherent dissolution of the bond between soil and people which was implied in the mission idea, a dissolution which for English politics was not a propagated ideology but an established fact with which every statesman had to reckon. What separates them definitely from later racists is that none of them was ever seriously concerned with discrimination against other peoples as lower races, if only for the reason that the countries they were talking about, Canada and Australia, were almost empty and did not have any serious population problem.
It is, therefore, not by accident that the first English statesman who repeatedly stressed his belief in races and race-superiority as a determining factor of history and politics, was a man who without any particular interest in the colonies and the English colonists -"the colonial deadweight which we do not govern" -wanted to extend British imperial power to Asia and who, indeed, forcefully strengthened the position of Great Britain in the only colony with a grave population and cultural problem. It was Benjamin Disraeli who made the Queen of England the Empress of India. The reasons which led Disraeli even in the early 'thirties to be such a consistent upholder of race-75 It would lead us too far here to discuss the religious origin, the secularization, and the final perversions of this idea which ended shamefully in the different pan-movements of our century.
76 For the same phenomenon in France see Auguste Comte, Discours sur l'Ensemble du Positivisme (1848), in which he expressed the hope for a united organized, regenerated humanity under the leadership-"presidence"-of France, p. 384 ff. thinking that he opposed "this modern newfangled sentimental principle of nationality"77 are manifold. There was, probably first of all, the fact that he, being a Jew and considered by his own party as an upstart, was clever enough to make an asset of the fact that he did not belong to average middle-class society but to another "race" with as old a genealogy as any aristocracy could boast of. There was also certainly, the influence which Carlyle's heroic historiography had exercised upon ambitious young men who lacked a natural position in political and social life, and for whom hero-worship was as convenient as personality-worship had been for German intellectuals. But there was also the definite line of his policy which brought him automatically within very close relationship to more recent ideologies. 78 Disraeli was the first English sttaesman who regarded India as the cornerstone of an Empire and who wanted to cut the ties which linked the English people to the nations of the Continent.79 Thereby he laid the foundations of a fundamental change in British rule in India. This colony had been governed with the usual ruthlessness of conquerorsof men whom Burke had called "the breakers of law in India." It was now to receive a carefully planned administration which aimed at the establishment of a permanent government by administrative measures. This experiment has brought England very near to the danger against which Burke had already warned, namely, that the "breakers of law in India" might become "the makers of law for England."80 Fortunately enough, up to now this has not happened; despite repeated complaints of the Indian party in England about the interference of the Parliament with their administration,81 the power of Parliament, the democratic institutions and the soundness of the nation as a whole have proved stronger than all imperialistic aspirations.82
The new policy introduced by Disraeli signified the establishment of an exclusive caste in a foreign country whose only function was rule and not colonization. For the realization of this conception which Disraeli did not live to see accomplished, racism would, indeed, be an indispensable tool. It foreshadowed the menacing transformation of the people from a nation into an "unmixed race of a first-rate organization" that felt itself as "the aristocracy of nature" -to put it in Disraeli's own words.83
What we have followed so far is the story of an opinion in which we only now, after all the terrible experiences of our times, have come to see the first dawn of racism. But although racism has revived elements of race-thinking in every country, it is not the history of an idea endowed by some "immanent logic" with which we were concerned. Race-thinking had been a source of convenient arguments for varying political conflicts, but it never had possessed any kind of monopoly in the political life of the respective nations; it had sharpened and exploited existing conflicting interests or existing political problems, but it never had created any new conflicts or produced new categories of political thinking. Racism sprang from experiences and political constellations which were still unknown and would have been utterly strange even to such devoted defenders of "race" as Gobineau or Disraeli or Nietzsche. There is an abyss between the men of brilliant and facile conceptions and the men of brutal deeds and active bestiality, an abyss which no intellectual explanation is able to bridge. It is highly probable that the thinking in terms of race would have disappeared in due time together with other irresponsible opinions of the nineteenth century, if the "scramble for Africa" and the new era of imperialism had not exposed Western humanity to new and shocking experiences. Imperialism would have necessitated the invention of racism as the only possible "explanation" and excuse for its deeds, even if no race-thinking ever had existed in the civilized world.
Since, however, race-thinking did exist, it proved to be a powerful help for racism. The very existence of such an opinion which could boast of a certain tradition served to hide the destructive forces of the new doctrine which, without this appearance of national respectability or the seeming sanction of tradition, might have disclosed its utter incompatibility with all Western political or moral standards of the past, even before it was allowed to destroy the comity of the European nations.
